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THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND
ITS LEGACY ON THE RESOLUTION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY DISPUTES
JAMES M. COOPER*
I. INTRODUCTION
We are approaching the twentieth anniversary of three institutions
that provide for intellectual property rights (IPR) dispute resolution
and settlement: the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), the Trade-related Aspects on Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) of the World Trade Organization (WTO),2 and the
Arbitration and Mediation Center of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO).' Now is an apt time to take stock of these
important innovations in the financial and legal architecture of our
globalized system of IPR.
Given our location near the U.S.-Mexico border,4 and this law
school's engagement with Latin America,' this essay focuses on
* Institute Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. The author
would like to thank Yesenia Acosta, Miguel Penalosa, and Priscilla Salgado for their
research assistance.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. Congress approved NAFTA by means of
the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103
182, 107 Stat. 2057 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3311 (2006)). NAFTA became
effective on January 1, 1994. Exec. Order No. 12889, 58 Fed. Reg. 69, 681 (Dec.
27, 1993).
2. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994).
3. See generally WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, WORLD INTELL.
PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/center/background.html (last visited Sept.
23, 2012).
4. See NAFTA Summer Program, CWSL.EDU., http://www.cwst.edu/nafta (last
visited Sept. 23, 2012). See generally JAMES M. COOPER, THE COMPLICATED
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NAFTA and the contributions that this regional trade pact made to
protect IPR and settle intellectual property (IP) disputes. It also
explores the legacy of NAFTA in the context of the eventual WTO,
and the rights provided by the TRIPS Agreement that was concluded
as part of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) negotiations. 6 Section II provides a brief historical
background on how NAFTA fit into the world as countries began
aligning themselves by creating various trade agreements. Section III
surveys the provisions and legacy of NAFTA with respect to IPR, and
the lack of real progress in the resolution of disputes using NAFTA's
pioneering independent arbitration process. Next, section IV of this
essay looks to the manner in which Mexico has attempted to comply
with NAFTA. Section V of this essay examines NAFTA's legacy for
the rest of the Americas, and section VI concludes with a discussion
on how NAFTA can further improve the protection of LPR in the
future.
II. NAFTA
NAFTA, the seminal regional trade pact between Canada, the
United States, and Mexico, went into force on January 1, 1994.
NAFTA was a remarkable hallmark in U.S. trade policy. It was a
revolutionary move to bring together the Canadian, Mexican, and U.S.
economies. NAFTA built upon the already existing 1989 Free Trade
Agreement between Canada and the United States. However, the
RELATIONSHIP: A SNAPSHOT OF THE U.S.-MEXICo BORDER (Konrad Adenauer
Stiftung ed., 2010), available at http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_19916-1522-2-
30.pdfl01 110153710.
5. California Western School of Law is the home of Proyecto ACCESO, a
leading legal skills training and civic education program in Latin America. See
James M. Cooper, Proyecto A CCESO: Using Popular Culture to Build the Rule of
Law in Latin America, 5 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 378, 383-87 (2008); see also El
Estado de Derecho en las Amdricas, PROYECTO ACCESO,
http://www.proyectoacceso.com (last visited Sept. 23, 2012).
6. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
7. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), OFF. U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/
north-american-free-trade-agreement-nafta (last visited Nov. 13, 2012).
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Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement was not that much of
stretch because it integrated two advanced economies. However, a
paradigm shift occurred when the United States decided to include its
southern neighbor in a regional integration pact. 9
United States' trade policymakers viewed the addition of Mexico
as necessary.o In fact, some advocates said it was a matter of national
security." Others even believed it would resolve America's post-Cold
War identity crisis. 12 U.S. officials promoted NAFTA as a national
security imperative that would ensure the United States could survive
the onslaught of competition from other recently formed regional
trade blocs, provide jobs for Mexicans, and allow the United States to
enjoy economic efficiencies that come with comparative advantage.
Creating jobs would encourage Mexican citizens to stay in Mexico
and provide them with the means by which they could consume
American-made products and services. 13 Lower-skilled wages would
8. The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement was implemented by the
United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1516a, 1677f(d) (1988)), as
amended by the Customs and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-383, §§ 134, 104
Stat. 629 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1516a, 1677f (Supp. IV 1992)), by the
regulations of the International Trade Administration, 19 C.F.R. pt. 356, and of the
International Trade Commission, 19 C.F.R. pt. 207.60-69.
9. "NAFTA was a brave new world for the three governments." David A.
Gantz, The Evolution of U.S. Views on FTA Investment Protection: From NAFTA to
the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, in THE FIRST DECADE OF NAFTA:
THE FUTURE OF FREE TRADE IN NORTH AMERICA 503, 507 (Kevin C. Kennedy ed.,
2004).
10. See MAXWELL A. CAMERON & BRIAN W. TOMLIN, THE MAKING OF
NAFTA: How THE DEAL WAS DONE 182-83 (2000).
11. See JOHN R. MACARTHUR, THE SELLING OF "FREE TRADE": NAFTA,
WASHINGTON, AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 261 (2000).
12. Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Homer, The North American Free Trade
Agreement: Its Major Provisions, Economic Benefits, and Overarching
Implications, in THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: A NEW
FRONTIER IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE AMERICAS 1, 9-10
(Judith H. Bello, Alan F. Homer & Joseph J. Norton eds., 1994).
13. Wayne A. Cornelius, Impacts of NAFTA on Mexico-to-U.S. Migration, in
NAFTA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 287, 290 (Edward J. Chambers & Peter H. Smith
eds., 2002) ("Pro-NAFTA political leaders in both Mexico and the United States
routinely characterized the agreement as the best possible antidote to illegal
immigration, even in the short term."); see also Bello & Homer, supra note 12, at 5.
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flow to Mexico, as the low cost of labor in Mexico would become a
comparative advantage for that country.' 4 As a result, all three
countries would experience economic growth.' 5
A. NAFTA's Influence
In addition to the proposed benefits that NAFTA would bring to
the United States, NAFTA greatly influenced subsequent trade
agreements. For example, the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas
(FTAA) was to be modeled after NAFTA.16 President George H.W.
Bush's administration championed this proposed trade pact as a way
to integrate the economies of the thirty-four states of the Western
Hemisphere-all but Cuba.' 7 NAFTA was thus destined to be the first
jigsaw puzzle piece of other trade agreements that would follow, and
its provisions were adapted in subsequent years as the United States
went on to enter into treaties with other regional trading partners.' 8
The NAFTA proposal came at a time when the world began
dividing up into regional trading blocs. NAFTA was not the only
trade agreement in the Americas. Other countries had competing
visions; Brazil and its surrogate organization, MERCOSUR, grew
stronger.19 Brazil's economic growth helped it become a BRIC
14. See Bello & Homer, supra note 12, at 8.
15. See id. at 3, 5-9.
16. See James M. Cooper, Spirits in the Material World: A Post-Modern
Approach to United States Trade Policy, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 957, 986 (1999).
However, the FTAA was never ratified and has not entered into force; it was left
stillborn at a summit in Mar del Plata on November 5, 2005. Americas Summit Fails
to End Free-Trade Stalemate, REUTERS (Nov. 5, 2005, 10:47 PM), available at
11/5/05 Reuters 22:47:06 (Westlaw).
17. RAYMOND J. AHEARN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 1B95017, TRADE AND THE
AMERICAS 1-2 (2004); see also Still No Surrender in Cuba, ECONOMIST (Apr. 19,
2001), http://www.economist.com/node/579191.
18. See Mark B. Baker, No Country Left Behind: The Exporting of U.S. Legal
Norms Under the Guise of Economic Integration, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1321,
1363-64 (2005).
19. See Andres Oppenheimer, The Winner of Mercosur's Expansion: Brazil,
MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/08/01/
2925986/the-winner-of-mercosurs-expansion.html; see also Mercosur Has Only
Benefited Brazil in the Last Ten Years with a Surplus of 36.8 Bn, MERCOPRESS
(Aug. 7, 2012), http://en.mercopress.com/2012/08/07/mercosur-has-only-benefited-
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country.20 The country now has the sixth largest economy in the
world.2' Its influence and financial might continued to grow, making
it less interested in the proposed U.S.-led FTAA.
Further, a group of left-of-center, populist leaders in Cuba,
Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and other countries offered an
alternative view to the free trade negotiations that were occurring
around the Americas. 22 In 2004, they created the Alianza Bolivariana
para los Pueblos de Nuestra Amdrica, an agreement that the founders
hoped would provide a "geopolitical counterweight to the United
States."23 But these alternatives did not spell the end of the NAFTA
model. Instead, a plethora of agreements came in its aftermath: the
U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA), 24 the Dominican Republic-
Central America-United States FTA (U.S.-CAFTA-DR), 25 the U.S.-
brazil-in-the-last-ten-years-with-a-surplus-of-36.8bn.
20. JIM O'NEILL, GLOBAL ECONOMICS PAPER No: 66: BUILDING BETTER
GLOBAL ECONOMIC BRICs 3-4 (2011), available at
http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/brics/building-better.html (noting that
BRIC originally included Brazil, Russia, India, and China). In 2010, South Africa
was invited to join the "group of major emerging markets," creating BRICS. South
Africa Invited to Join Emerging Nations Group, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2010); see
also New Era as South Africa Joins BRICS, SOUTHAFRICA.INFO (Apr. 11, 2011),
http://www.southafrica.info/global/brics/brics-080411 .htm#.UJVSVMXA8pk.
21. Joe Leahy & Stefano Wagstyl, Brazil Becomes Sixth Largest Economy,
FIN. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e23a2b34-678e-11el-
b4al-00144feabdcO.html#axzz2BwO44cZI (U.K.).
22. See Cuba, Bolivia, Venezuela Reject U.S. Trade, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30,
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/30/world/americas/30iht-web.0430trade
.html.
23. Joel D. Hirst, The Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas - Hugo Chavez's
Bold Plan, EXCHANGE, Dec. 2010, at 15, 15 (known in English as the Bolivarian
Alliance of the Americas). See generally BOLIVARIAN ALLIANCE FOR THE PEOPLES
OF OUR AMERICA PEOPLES' TRADE TREATY, http://www.alba-tcp.org/en (last visited
on Nov. 9, 2012).
24. United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, 42
I.L.M. 1026, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/chile-fta/final-text.
25. United States-Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade
Agreement, Aug. 5, 2004 [hereinafter U.S.-CAFTA-DR], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-
republic-central-america-fta/final-text.
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Peru FTA,26 the U.S.-Colombia FTA2 7 and the Panama Trade
Promotion Agreement (TPA).28 The United States ratified both the
U.S.-Colombia FTA and the Panama TPA on October 12, 2011.29
B. Regional Trade Agreements and the Need
for a Rules-Based Trade Regime
Twenty years ago, the world appeared to be dividing into regional
trading groups like the European Union and MERCOSUR, 3 0 as the
26. United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, Apr. 12, 2006,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-
tpa/final-text.
27. United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Colom., Nov.
22, 2006, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/colombia-fta/final-text.
28. United States-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Pan., June 28,
2007, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/panama-tpa/final-text.
29. WIPO Resources-News on Treaties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/news-treaties [hereinafter News on Treaties]; see
also Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States,
Colombia Set Date for Entry into Force of U.S.-Colombia Trade Agreement (Apr.
15, 2012), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-
releases/2012/april/united-states-colombia-set-date-entry-force-us-colom;
Colombian President Praises U.S. Congress for Ratifying Free Trade Agreement,
MERCOPRESS (Oct. 13, 2011, 7:50 AM), http://en.mercopress.com/2011/10/13/
colombian-president-praises-us-congress-for-ratifying-free-trade-agreement. The
U.S.-Colombia FTA entered into force on May 15, 2012. News on Treaties, supra.
The Panama TPA entered into force on October 31, 2012. Melanie Wheeler, Date
Set for Entry-into-Force of the U.S.-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement, WHITE
HOUSE BLOG (Oct. 23, 2012, 12:53 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog; see also
Int'l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev., Officials: U.S.-Panama Trade Pact to
Enter into Force Next Week, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., Oct. 24, 2012, at
12, 12, available at http://ictsd.org/downloads/bridgesweekly/bridgesweeklyl6-
36.pdf.
30. The Mercado Comin del Sur (Southern Cone Customs Union), was
formed by the Argentine Republic, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic
of Paraguay, and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay. Joanna Klonsky, Mercosur:
South America's Fractious Trade Block, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.,
http://www.cfr.org/trade/mercosur-south-americas-fractious-trade-bloc/pl2762 (last
updated July 31, 2012). These countries signed the Treaty of Asunci6n on March
26, 1991. Treaty of Asunci6n, Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041, available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/mrcsrtoc.asp. Venezuela joined officially in
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global trade talks through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) Uruguay Round 3 1 were faltering.
In 1993, the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round trade
negotiations was anything but a sure thing.32 The Uruguay Round
talks, which would later result in the creation of the WTO, were
bogged down with French demands for restricted access of U.S. films
to their country's cinema screens.3 3 The trade talks nearly collapsed
entirely, as French pressure on the European Union made the overall
agreement more difficult to achieve. 34
A failure to resolve this negotiation deadlock would have meant
more than the WTO being pronounced a stillborn institution. Without
the WTO, there would be no enforceable trade rules or institutions to
adjudicate trade disputes, including those involving IPR.35 The lack
of a rules-based trade dispute resolution system leads to a state of
nature with trade wars, boycotts, sanctions, and other unilateral-and
2012, some six years after applying for membership. See Shane Romig, Venezuela
to Join Mercosur Trade Bloc, WALL. ST. J. (June 29, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303649504577497123531357032.
html?KEYWORDS=Venezuela+Mercosur.
31. See generally Final Act, supra note 6.
32. See, e.g., Alan Riding, GATT Pact is Sought by Year End, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 27, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/11/27/business/gatt-pact-is-sought-
by-year-end.html; The Uruguay Round, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/tife/fact5_e.htm. The drama of
deadlocked trade negotiations is playing itself out again after a decade of
negotiations of the Doha Round. Int'l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev., 2012
Should Not Be a "Wasted Year, " Lamy Urges WTO Members, BRIDGES WKLY.
TRADE NEWS DIG., Feb. 15, 2012, at 1, 1-2, available at
http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/125553/; see also Raj Bhala & James Cooper,
Op-Ed., A World Trade Round Gone Bad, UTSANDIEGO.COM (June 3, 2011),
http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2011 /jun/03/a-world-trade-round-gone-bad/
("[T]he Doha Round [was] supposed to spark economic development through freer
trade and thereby reduce the appeal of extremism to marginalized Muslims.").
33. See Alan Riding, The World Trade Agreement: The French Strategy, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 15, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/15/business/world-trade-
agreement-french-strategy-months-risk-moments-isolation-now-boasts.html.
34. See id
35. See WORLD TRADE ORG., 10 BENEFITS OF THE WTO TRADING SYSTEM 2-4
(2008) [hereinafter 10 BENEFITS OF THE WTO], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/rese/doloade/10b_e.pdf.
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often political-practices. 36  A rules-based system with more
multilateral mechanisms for dispute resolution provides fairness,
standardization, and-in the case of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding 37 that emerged as part of the WTO treaty regime-
enforcement remedies.38 Without this system, many countries chose
an alternative solution by looking for preferential trade deals with
other countries in their region.
Before the Uruguay Round talks were successfully completed,
Europe continued down the road of further regional integration with
the Maastricht Treaty 39 and the creation of the European Union itself,
a large stop beyond the common market that had operated since the
Treaty of Rome in 1957.40 As the "twelve become one," 4 1 America
worried that its traditional trading partner and allies could become a
so-called "Fortress Europe."42 The European Union continued to
consolidate as other regional trading partners circled their wagons and
established preferential trade agreements with neighbors. In Southeast
Asia, the member countries of ASEAN 43 worked to promote more
36. See id at 2.
37. DSU, Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (1994) [hereinafter WTO
Dispute Settlement Rules].
38. See Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An
Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 2-3 (1999); see also
10 BENEFITS OF THE WTO, supra note 35, at 4.
39. Treaty on European Union [TEU, Maastricht Treaty], Feb. 7, 1992, 1992
O.J. (C191).
40. See Michael H. Abbey & Nicholas Bromfield, A Practitioner's Guide to
the Maastricht Treaty, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1329, 1329-30 (1994).
41. See PASCAL FONTAINE, EUROPE IN 12 LESSONs 11 (2006) (noting that the
twelve countries that adopted the euro-the single currency of the European
Union-were "commonly referred to as the euro zone").
42. See, e.g., Andrew P. Hoffman, Note and Comment, Reciprocity in
European Community and United States Banking Law, 11 ANN. REV. BANKING L.
539, 551 (1992) (describing the "Fortress Europe" concept as "a single market open
within its borders but closed to outsiders.").
43. ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] was founded on August
8, 1967 and is currently composed of ten member states. Overview, ASS'N OF
SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS, http://www.asean.org/asean/about-asean/overview.
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trade among its members. 44  In Latin America, the Southern Cone
countries harmonized their respective tariff policies when
MERCOSUR was created in 1991 with the Treaty of Asunci6n.45
As of January 2012, there are approximately 511 Regional Trade
Agreements (RTAs) registered with the WTO.46 These RTAs, in turn,
can stymie multilateral (i.e., WTO) negotiations, like the Doha Round
of WTO negotiations. Professor Jagdish Bhagwati called this
phenomenon "stumbling blocs" to reaching a global trade deal.47
III. NAFTA, DISPUTE RESOLUTION, AND A RULES-BASED IPR REGIME
NAFTA built upon the work of the GATT by providing
substantial protection for IPR, and it helped lead to the successful
conclusion of the GATT negotiations concerning a new agreement on
IPR.48
NAFTA, having been completed two years prior to the conclusion
of the Uruguay Round, helped the ratification of TRIPS not only by
44. Id. (listing one of ASEAN's aims and purposes as "[t]o collaborate more
effectively for . .. the expansion of their trade .... ).
45. Klonsky, supra note 30; see also Rafael Leal-Arcas, Proliferation of
Regional Trade Agreements: Complementing or Supplanting Multilateralism?, 11
CHI. J. INT'L L. 597, 626 n.100 (2010).
46. See Regional Trade Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/englishtratop e/region-e/region-e.htm (last visited on Nov. 9,
2012).
47. JAGDISH BHAGWATI, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AT RISK 77 (1991).
48. In 1986, the eighth round of global trade talks included IPR. According to
the September 20, 1986 Ministerial Declaration: "In order to reduce the distortions
and impediments to international trade, and taking into account the need to promote
effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that
measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves
become barriers to legitimate trade, the negotiations shall aim to clarify GATT
provisions and elaborate as appropriate new rules and disciplines." General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, Ministerial Declaration of 20 September 1986,
pt.I.D, 25 I.L.M. 1623 (1986), available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/Punta-e.asp. There would be a rules-based system for
the protection of IPR once a full dispute settlement system was integrated into the
WTO. See WTO Dispute Settlement Rules, supra note 37. It would be a direct alto
voce as the WTO established positive standards for the conduct of domestic policies
rather than negative standards. See generally id.
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drawing attention to IP rights as a "free trade" issue, but also by
undermining the cohesion of the Latin American opposition. Latin
American countries considered these intellectual property standards
as an "admission price" for becoming members of NAFTA.49
NAFTA provides for protection of copyrights (including sound
recordings), patents and trademarks, plant breeders' rights, industrial
designs and trade secrets, and integrated circuits (semiconductor
chips).50  NAFTA expanded the existing protection under Mexican
law for patents, copyrights, trademarks, service marks, and trade
secrets.51 Mexico agreed to protect patents, including process patents
for pharmaceuticals and agriculture chemicals; it also agreed to
"protect foreign registered patents for twenty years." 52  NAFTA
details procedures for enforcement of IPR and for damages in the
event of violations of such rights in the three jurisdictions.53
NAFTA includes several internal dispute resolution methods. 54
For example, "consultation is the most common method ... in
NAFTA. The most important consultation involves committees that
assemble at the request of the signatory countries, or sometimes at
periodic intervals."s5  There are a number of dispute resolution
mechanisms under NAFTA, but only two are relevant to protecting
against IPR violations by a NAFTA Party (Canada, Mexico, and the
49. Emir Aly Crowne, Fishing TRIPS: A Look at the History of the Agreement
on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property, 2 CREIGHTON INT'L & COMP. L.J.
77, 85 (2011) (citations omitted).
50. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 17.
51. David A. Gantz, Principal Features of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, in MAKING FREE TRADE WORK IN THE AMERICAS 34, 46 (Boris
Kozolchyk ed., 1993).
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 20.
54. Leonel Pereznieto, Dispute Resolution in NAFTA: A Comparative and
Sectoral Review, in MAKING FREE TRADE WORK IN THE AMERICAS 671, 674 (Boris
Kozolchyk, ed., Yvonne Boyed & Boris Kozolchyk, trans., 1993) ("Occasionally,
NAFTA does not set forth a mechanism for dispute resolution, but refers parties to a
variety of international agreements, each of which has its own system for dispute
resolution.").
55. Id. at 675.
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United States). The most relevant to this essay's discussion are
Chapter 11, which deals with investor-state disputes, and Chapter 20,
which provides a mechanism for all other disputes among the
sovereign Parties to NAFTA concerning the other chapters.
A.NAFTA Ch. I1-Investor-State Disputes
Chapter 11 "establishes a mechanism for the settlement of
investment disputes that assures both equal treatment among investors
of the Parties to the Agreement in accordance with the principle of
international reciprocity and due process before an impartial
tribunal."57 A NAFTA investor, an individual or corporation that is a
non-state actor rather than one of the signatory countries, who alleges
that a host government has breached its investment obligations, may
choose one of three arbitral mechanisms: the World Bank's
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID), ICSID's Additional Facility Rules, or the rules of the United
Nations Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL
Rules). Alternatively, the investor may choose the remedies
available in the host country's domestic courts.59  An important
feature of the Chapter 11 arbitral provisions is the enforceability in
domestic courts of final awards by arbitration tribunals.6 0
56. Id at 674. For example, chapter 14 provides for the settlement of financial
services disputes. NAFTA, ch. 14, arts. 1414-1415. Chapter 19 provides for settling
dumping and counter-veiling duties disputes. Id. ch. 19. These provisions are not
related to IPR or the settlement of IP disputes. See id. Chs. 14 & 19. Disputes
relating to the following chapters may be referred to dispute settlement procedures
under Chapter 20: including Chapters 7 (Agriculture and Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures), 10 (Government Procurement), 11 (non-compliance by a Party with final
award), and 14 (Financial Services). Id. chs. 7, 10, 11, 14, 20.
57. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11, art. 1115. "[T]here is a relative dearth of
information on the cases reviewed under Chapter 11." Antonio Ortiz-Mena L.N.,
Dispute Settlement under NAFTA, in NAFTA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 425, 428
(Edward J. Chambers & Peter H. Smith eds., 2002).
58. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11, art. 1120.
59. Id. ch. 11, art. 1135(2)(c).
60. Id. ch. 11, art. 1136(4).
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While parties have launched a number of investor-state disputes,61
most of which settled, there is no real record concerning IPR dispute
settlement.62
B.NAFTA Ch. 20-Institutional Arrangements and Dispute
Settlement Procedures
Chapter 20 provides for Institutional Arrangements and Dispute
Settlement Procedures. 63  The dispute settlement provisions of
Chapter 20 are applicable to all disputes "regarding the interpretation
or application" of NAFTA 64 and can be brought only by a NAFTA
Contracting Party (one of the three signatory states). The steps set out
in Chapter 20 are intended to resolve disputes by agreement, if
possible. 65 The process begins with government-to-government (i.e.,
the Parties) consultations. 66 If the dispute is not resolved, a Party may
request a meeting of the NAFTA Free-Trade Commission (comprised
of the Trade Ministers of the Parties).67 If the commission is unable to
resolve the dispute, a consulting Party may call for a five-member
arbitral panel to be established.68 With its preference for consultation
and pre-panel settlement, there is no history of an IPR dispute being
arbitrated to date.69  Chapter 20 also provides for scientific review
boards. 70 A panel, in consultation with the disputing Party, may select
these boards. 7' The board's purpose is to provide a written report "on
61. See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NAFTA REVISITED:
ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES 224 (2005).
62. E-mail from Todd Weiler, Founder of NAFTAClaims.com, to James M.
Cooper, Institute Professor of Law, Cal. W. Sch. of Law (Feb. 29, 2012) [hereinafter
E-mail from Todd Weiler] (on file with author); Interview with Jorge H. Amigo
Castefieda, Vice Chairman, Int'l Intellectual Prop. Inst., in Wash. D.C. (Jan. 18,
2012) [hereinafter Interview with Jorge H. Amigo Castefieda].
63. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 20.
64. Id. ch. 20, art. 2004.
65. See id. ch. 20, art. 2003.
66. Id. ch. 20, art. 2006.
67. Id. ch. 20, art. 2007.
68. Id. ch. 20, art. 2008, 2011.
69. Email from Todd Weiler, supra note 62; interview with Jorge H. Amigo
Castefieda, supra note 62.
70. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 20, art. 2015(1).
71. Id. ch. 20, art. 2015(2).
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any factual issue concerning environmental, health, safety, or other
scientific matters" to assist panels in rendering their decisions. 72
Each NAFTA country appoints ministers to comprise the NAFTA
commission; the commission is responsible for enforcing NAFTA's
provisions.73 A secretariat assists the commission in coordinating the
dispute resolution panels.74  When disputes arise between the
countries, the process works as follows:
[A] consultation can be requested at which all three NAFTA
countries can participate. If consultation does not resolve the
dispute, the commission will seek to settle the dispute through
mediation or similar means of alternative dispute resolution
procedures. If those measures are unsuccessful, a complaining
country can request that an arbitration panel be established. The
panel is composed of five members selected from a trilaterally
agreed upon list of trade, legal, and other experts. After study, the
panel issues a confidential initial report. After receiving comments
from the parties, a final report will be prepared and conveyed to the
commission. If the panel finds that a NAFTA country violated its
NAFTA obligations, the disputing parties have 30 days to reach an
agreement. If none is reached, NAFTA benefits may be suspended
against the violating country in an amount equivalent to the panel's
recommended penalty until the dispute is resolved."
While there are a few Chapter 20 arbitration panels that have been
constituted under NAFTA, none have dealt with IPR specifically. 7 6
This is not to say there have been no major failures to protect the IPR
of the businesses of the Parties in the other partners' territories.
72. Id. ch. 20, art. 2015(1).
73. Id. ch. 20, art. 2001(1); see also About NAFTA-North American Free
Trade Agreement, NAFTANOW.ORG, http://www.naftanow.org/about/default-en.
asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2012) [hereinafter About NAFTA].
74. See NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 20, art. 2002(3); see also About NAFTA,
supra note 73.
75. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), REFERENCE FOR BUS.,
http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/encyclopedia/Mor-Off/North-American-Free-
Trade-Agreement-NAFTA.html?&lang=en-us&output=j son (last visited Nov. 18,
2012); NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 20.
76. Email from Todd Weiler, supra note 62; interview with Jorge H. Amigo
Castefieda, supra note 62.
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Mexico, for example, has consistently failed to grant the concessions
to the NAFTA Parties concerning IPR protections as agreed upon in
Chapter 17 of the trilateral agreement.
IV. LA MEXICANA: NAFTA RULES AND THE SYSTEMATIC DISREGARD
FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
Bringing Mexico into the fold by aligning its laws with that of
Canada and the United States was not an easy task. Integrating the
economies of the United States and Canada was much easier.
However, NAFTA was not just an extension of the 1989 Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement. Prior to NAFTA, Mexico was considered a
third world country. Its labor practices, institutions, and judicial
processes were different and more vulnerable to corruption." Data
collected from various organizations illustrates these differences. One
need only examine the Bertelsmann Foundation's Transformation
Index;79 the latest report from the national chapter of Transparency
International in Mexico, Transparencia Mexicana;80  and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
77. See AMBASSADOR RONALD KIRK, 2012 Special 301 Report, OFF. U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, at 47 (2012), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2012%2OSpecial %20301%20Report.pdf.
78. See, e.g., People Say Corruption in Mexico is Getting Worse,
TRANSPARENCY INT'L (May 11, 2011),
http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/20110511_Mexicoworse; Eduardo
Boh6rquez & Deniz Devrim, Mexico and the G20 Presidency: Stronger Leadership
and Anticorruption Effort Needed, TRANSPARENCY INT'L (Nov. 7, 2011),
http://blog.transparency.org/2011/11/07/mexico-and-the-g20-presidency-the-need-
for-stronger-leadership-and-higher-consistency-in-anticorruption-efforts/ (describing
the difficulties Mexico has with fighting bribery and corruption).
79. See generally BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, BTI 2010 MEXICO COUNTRY
REPORT (2009), available at http://www.bti-
project.org/fileadmin/Inhalte/reports/2010/pdf/BTI%202010%2OMexico.pdf.
80. See generally TRANSPARENCIA MEXICANA, INDICE NACIONAL DE
CORRUPTION Y BUEN GOBIERNO-INFORME EJECUTIVO 2010 [National Index of
Corruption and Good Government-Executive Report], Mayo 10, 2011, (Mex.),
available at
http://www.transparenciamexicana.org.mx/documentos/INCBG/2010/1_Informeejec
utivoINCBG2010%209mayo2O 11.pdf.
81. Mexico has made some progress fighting corruption. Mexico has opened
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Mexico had to change many of its laws in order to comply with
the dictates of NAFTA. For example, Mexico had to amend Article
27 of its Constitution 82 to address Mexico's communal landholding
doctrine, the ejido.83 It also had to change its investment laws to
allow for full legal foreign ownership.84 For the purposes of this
essay, no change was more important than that necessary to comply
with Chapter 17 of NAFTA-the provisions concerning IPR.85 Prior
to 1991, Mexico was the exemplar of state intervention; the country
had a Technology Transfer Commission with a veto power over most
IP licensing and franchising agreements. 8 6  The Commission also
controlled the terms and conditions of technology transfer
agreements." The Commission even decided the level of acceptable
its first two foreign bribery investigations. See Boh6rquez & Devrim, supra note
78; see also OECD WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY, PHASE 3 REPORT ON
IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN MEXICO 4 (2011)
[hereinafter PHASE 3 REPORT], available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/60/7/48897634.pdf. Mexico has also made some improvements to its
legislative framework for fighting foreign bribery, such as by amending the foreign
bribery offence. PHASE 3 REPORT, supra, at 9.
82. Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as
amended, art. 27, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917
(Mex.).
83. See M. ANGELES VILLARREAL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34733,
NAFTA AND THE MEXICAN ECONOMY 11-12 (2010); see also Ronald H. Schmidt &
William C. Gruben, Ejido Reform and the NAFTA, FRBSF WKLY LETTER, Oct. 2,
1992, available at http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/1992/el92-
34.pdf.
84. Dean C. Alexander, Mexico's Foreign Investment Law of 1993,
Amendments to the Maquila Decree, and an Overview of Maquiladoras, in NAFTA
AND INVESTMENT 65, 65 (Seymour J. Rubin & Dean C. Alexander eds., 1995).
85. Joseph S. Papovich, NAFTA's Provisions Regarding Intellectual Property:
Are They Working as Intended?-A U.S. Perspective, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 253, 259
(1997). "[O]n intellectual property protection, Mexico has made generous
concessions, simply because Mexico expects to profit immensely from preferential
access to a [sic] gigantic markets." Jagdish Bhagwati, NAFTA, in SHADOW OPEN
MARKET COMMITTEE 12 (Sept. 13-14, 1992), available at
http://www.shadowfed.org/pdfs/1992_09_14.pdf.
86. See Catherine Brown & Christine Manolakas, Trade in Technology Within
the Free Trade Zone: The Impact of the WTO Agreement, NAFTA, and Tax Treaties
on the NAFTA Signatories, 21 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 71, 73 & n.7 (2000-2001).
87. Id. at 73 n.7.
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royalties.88 In 1991, Mexico abolished the Commission and most
technology transfer controls, enabling licensors and licensees the
freedom to strike their own bargains. 89
The Mexican Institute of Industrial Property (IMPI) was created
to administer Mexico's trademark and patent registries.90 The IMPI is
responsible for handling administrative cases of IPR infringement and
has four regional offices to receive documentation. 91 Mexico divides
its IP laws into two areas: intellectual property and industrial property.
Mexico adopted its new Industrial Property Law in 1991,92 and its
new Federal Copyright Law took effect in 1997.93 In 1994, Mexico
joined the Patent Cooperation Treaty. 94 NAFTA provided for
minimum standards through a plethora of international IP treaties,95
including the Geneva Convention on Phonograms, 96 the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 97 the
88. Geoffrey Kransdorf, Intellectual Property, Trade, and Technology
Transfer Law: The United States and Mexico, 7 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 277, 285-86
(1987) ("Because excessive licensing fees or royalties are one of the prohibited
conditions [of the law], the government essentially has the power to set prices for
the purchase of technology at whatever level it feels is reasonable.").
89. See Keith J. Kanouse, Franchising Internationally, in FRANCHISE L. &
PRAC. §13.16 (Fla. B. ed., 2d ed. 1996).
90. See About IMPI, INSTITUTO MEXICANO DE LA PROPIEDAD INDUSTRIAL,
http://www.impi.gob.mx/wb/impi-en/about impi (last visited Oct. 26, 2012) (Mex.).
91. See Regional Offices, INSTITUTO MEXICANO DE LA PROPIEDAD
INDUSTRIAL, http://www.impi.gob.mx/wb/impi-en/regional_offices_ok (last visited
Oct. 26, 2012) (Mex.).
92. Ley de la Propiedad Industrial [LPI] [Industrial Property Law], as
amended, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 25 de Junio de 1991 (Mex.),
available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=1 1711.
93. Ley Federal del Derecho de Autor [LFDA] [Federal Copyright Law], as
amended, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 5 de Diciembre de 1996 (Mex.),
available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=3079.
94. See Contracting Parties-Patent Cooperation Treaty, WORLD INTELL.
PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty id=6 (last
visited Oct. 26, 2012).
95. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 17, art. 1701.
96. Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against
Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms, Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309.
97. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris
Act), last revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341.
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Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,98 and the
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants.99 In essence, Mexico had to completely revise many of its
domestic rules to meet its obligations with its NAFTA partners.
Further, NAFTA imposes criminal penalties for "willful trademark
counterfeiting or copyright piracy undertaken on a commercial
scale." 0  NAFTA also provides for the general duty to protect IP
adequately and effectively as long as barriers to legitimate trade are
not created.'o'
Despite NAFTA's expansive provisions, Mexico has a history of
weak enforcement of IPR, and this area of law is developing slowly.
Thus, Mexico remains on the U.S. Trade Representative's Special 301
"Watch List" due to "inadequate IPR protection and enforcement,"1 0 2
although it was taken off the Watch List from 2000 to 2002.103
Mexico continues to struggle with IPR infringement issues, such as
pirated and counterfeit goods sold in various local markets. For
98. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20,
1883, last revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583.
99. International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants,
Dec. 2, 1961, 33 U.S.T. 2703.
100. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 17, art. 1717(1).
101. Id. art. 1701.
102. Ambassador Ronald Kirk, 2011 Special 301 Report, OFF. U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, at 37 (2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm send/2841;
see also OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2009 NATIONAL TRADE
ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 339 (2009) [hereinafter FOREIGN
TRADE BARRIERS], available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/ctyindex/USA/ftbmex2009_e.pdf.
103. See 2000 USTR Special 301 Report, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L (Sept.
16, 2009) http://www.keionline.org/ustr/2000special301; Ambassador Robert B.
Zoellick, 2001 Special 301 Report, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, at 3 (2001),
available at http://www.keionline.org/sites/default/files/ustr_special3012001.pdf;
Ambassador Robert B. Zoellick, 2002 Special 301 Report, OFF. U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, at 1 (2002), available at
http://www.keionline.org/sites/default/files/ustr-special301 2002.pdf. In 2003, the
U.S. Trade Representative once again placed Mexico back on the Watch List.
Ambassador Robert B. Zoellick, 2003 Special 301 Report, OFF. U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, at 27 (2003), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/archive/assets/DocumentLibrary/Reports Publications/2003/2
003_Special_301_Report/assetuploadfile665_6124.pdf.
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example, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative issued its annual
Foreign Trade Barriers report in 2009, where it noted the continuing
IP violations that occur in Mexico. The report noted that "local
authorities in Mexico City [attempted] to move street vendors into the
formal economy," and the Office of the Attorney General employed a
similar strategy of "market reconversion." 04 But, these efforts have
not been successful:
[W]ell-known markets selling pirated and counterfeit goods, such
as Tepito Market in Mexico City, San Juan de Dios Market in
Guadalajara, and others in Monterrey and San Luis Potosi, continue
to operate openly. In 2008, Mexico City authorities removed
unlicensed vendors from certain parts of the historic center of the
city and seized two properties that were being used for illicit
commerce in Tepito, but these actions were narrowly targeted. 05
As a consequence of these illegal operations, the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative published its Notorious Markets list
("List") on December 20, 2011.106 The List is an out-of-cycle review
of the presence of marketplaces that "deal in goods and services that
infringe upon intellectual property rights."'0o On the List was the
Tepito Market, which is reportedly the main warehousing and
distribution center for pirated and counterfeit products sold at
numerous informal markets throughout Mexico. 08 The List states that
"[d]espite enforcement actions that resulted in significant seizures,
illicit activity allegedly persists in Tepito."109 There is also an
increasing connection between the narcotraficantes"o and IP piracy
activities."' Despite this wholesale violation of IPR, there has been
104. FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS, supra note 102.
105. Id.
106. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW OF
NOTORIOUS MARKETS (2011) [hereinafter NOTORIOUS MARKETS], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm-send/3215.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See COOPER, supra note 4, at 3-4, for a summary of drug trafficking
issues in Mexico.
111. See David Luhnow & Jos6 de Cordoba, The Perilous State of Mexico,
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no movement using Chapter 11 or Chapter 20 by the United States (or
Canada).
V. NAFTA's LEGACY CONCERNING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS
Mexico is not alone in Latin America when it comes to IPR
infringement." 2 The various San Andresitos marketplaces operating
throughout Colombia (e.g., Bogoti and Cali), also made the list of
notorious markets. 113 These Colombian markets "are notorious for
unauthorized reproduction of music, video games, and movies, and for
the unauthorized distribution of pirated and counterfeit goods." 1 4
There is also the internationally renowned piracy center of Ciudad del
Este in Paraguay-very close to the borders of Argentina and Brazil-
the so-called "Triple Frontier" area." 5
Argentina is always on the radar and not just because of the
immense La Salada market in Buenos Aires, which is dangerous to
law enforcement on its best days. The illicit counterfeiting industry
funds terrorism, like the November 1994 bombing of the Jewish
Community Center (AMIA) in Buenos Aires by Hezbollah.116 In
addition, the U.S. government is concerned by the annual loss of
millions of dollars of revenue-money due to legitimate rights
holders-that Argentina does not pay.
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 21, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123518102536038463
.html.
112. See generally Inti Linkletter Knapp, The Software Piracy Battle in Latin
America: Should the United States Pursue Its Aggressive Bilateral Trade Policy
Despite the Multilateral TRIPS Enforcement Framework?, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON.
L. 173 (2000), for an examination of copyright law differences in Latin America,
with a particular focus on Argentina and Brazil.
113. NOTORIOUS MARKETS, supra note 106.
114. Id.
115. James M. Cooper, Piracy 101, 36 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 89,98 (2005).
116. See Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah Finances: Funding the Party of God,
WASH. INST. FOR NEAR EAST POL'Y (Feb. 2005)
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hezbollah-finances-
funding-the-party-of-god.
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The trade agreements in the Americas that followed NAFTA
made a major change in the investor-dispute provisions." 7  For
example, Chapter 10 of the U.S.-CAFTA-DR (the chapter dedicated to
investor-state disputes like Chapter 11 of NAFTA), states that the
term "investment" covers all forms of investment, including
enterprises, securities, debt, IPR, licenses, and contracts."' NAFTA
did not provide for the inclusion of IPR in this definition of
"investment."ll 9 Chapter 10 of the U.S.-CAFTA-DR also provides a
mechanism for an investor of a Party to submit a damages claim to
binding international arbitration. 20 Hence, under a NAFTA Chapter
20 dispute panel, the only litigants are NAFTA countries themselves,
rather than individuals (or corporations), the latter of which can be a
party in a Chapter 11 investment dispute.
It is also important to note that the IP provisions in FTAs that
followed NAFTA have strengthened their respective enforcement
provisions.121 The IP chapters of the trade agreements, which the
United States entered into with countries in the Americas from 2003
to 2008, also provide for the adoption of innovations that did not
appear in similar trade agreements before 2003.122
VI. CONCLUSIONS-NAFTA AS METAPHOR
We are living, at least in the United States, in a post-industrial, 12 3 or
knowledge-based, economy.124  As the United States outsourced
117. See Gantz, supra note 9, at 503, 508-09.
118. U.S.-CAFTA-DR, supra note 25, ch. 10, art. 10.28.
119. See NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11, art. 1139.
120. U.S.-CAFTA-DR, supra note 25, ch. 10, art. 10.17.
121. See Charles S. Levy & Stuart Weiser, Intellectual Property, in A NEW
FRONTIER IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENTS IN THE AMERICAS 269, 270
(Judith H. Bello, Alan F. Holmer & Joseph J. Norton, eds., 1994) ("[E]xisting
agreements like the NAFTA are a floor to be built on, and the United States will
likely pursue a strategy of ratcheting up the protection provided to intellectual
property rights in each subsequent initiative.").
122. Horacio Rangel-Ortiz, Patent Rights in Commercial Agreements Recently
Entered by the U.S.A. with Nations of the South, 16 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 52,
53 (2008).
123. See generally, DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL
SOCIETY: A VENTURE IN SOCIAL FORECASTING (1976).
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millions of manufacturing jobs to Mexico, China, and any number of
other industrializing countries with abundant low-cost unskilled labor,
the United States was able to base its economic growth on services
and new innovations. Hence, a well-developed regime of enforcement
of IPR is an essential part of the development strategies for economic
growth in the developed world.12 5 IPR protection is often viewed as
the signal of a country's development into a fully functioning liberal
democracy, which is capable of sustainable economic growth.126
There are clearly a number of humanitarian concerns that come with
compulsory licensing, costs of innovation, and accessibility of drugs
to people in poor and developing countries.127  But this does not
discount the need to provide incentives for innovation and the
124. See Robin Cowan & Elad Harison, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
A KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 10 (2001), available at
http://edoes.ub.unimaas.nlloader/file.asp?id=231.
125. See generally Robert M. Sherwood, Intellectual Property Systems and
Investment Stimulation: The Rating of Systems in Eighteen Developing Countries,
37 IDEA 261 (1997) (assessing and comparing national intellectual property
regimes through a numerical rating system). "The rating system examines regime
effectiveness from the perspective of private investment stimulation, particularly
national private investment. This system, in turn, may provide a basis for assessing
the contribution which intellectual property protection makes to the process of
economic development." Id. at 261.
126. See, e.g., Amir H. Khoury, "Measuring the Immeasurable" - The Effects
of Trademark Regimes: A Case Study of Arab Countries, 26 J. L. & COM. 11, 13
(2006-2007). "Arab countries lag behind developed countries in all three levels of
trademark registration namely the 'Absolute,' 'Relative' and 'Particular.' Arab
countries are at a disadvantage in terms of actual trademark registration both within
their respective jurisdictions and beyond. Not only is the number of registrations
much smaller than that of developed countries, but, also the relative share of non-
resident owned marks that are registered in Arab countries is much higher than the
comparable rate in developed countries. Furthermore, the 'particular level' indicates
that developed countries dominate 'foreign registrations' in Arab countries. This
situation has been largely constant throughout three decades (1970-2000)." Id. at
68. Further, "products and services that dominate Arab economies have a very low
'trademark potential."' Id.
127. See generally Juan Bacalsk, Mexico's Pharmaceutical Patent Dilemma
and the Lesson of India, 23 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 717 (2006) (exploring the
mature Indian pharmaceutical industry and the manner in which it may be a model
for Mexico's industry; also describing how the two industries may be compared and
what important lessons may be learned).
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recouping of investment of research and development. These are not
new discussions.
The advances in the internet, social media, wireless technology,
and electronic commerce over the last two decades require us to take
stock of how to best monetize innovation, reward risk and discovery,
and grow economies. While NAFTA's benefits are still being
debated, evidence is emerging that the Mexican middle class,
decimated in the 1995 currency devaluation (the so-called tequila
effectl2 8), is coming back (even in the face of the escalating drug war
in Mexico). 129 But we must still query what were the spillover effects
to the change in IP rules? In the case of NAFTA, was this positive or
negative for Mexico? Was this a form of judicial imperialism or part
of an overall development strategy that worked? How has the lack of
enforcement of IPR contributed to the overall breakdown in the rule of
law in Mexico? We need only look at the direct relationship between
narcotraffickers and IP pirates (as well as arms, human, and other
trafficking) to begin to understand the dynamics behind Mexico's
failings.
There are a number of formal dispute resolution mechanisms that
involve states but also those that involve non-state partners. Clearly,
the state Parties (at least under NAFTA) have not used Chapter 20 to
deal with systemic lack of concessions granted to the other partner
Parties. The countries themselves can complain that their individuals
and corporations trading in the trade area are not receiving the
concessions provided for under NAFTA-in other words, they are not
having their rights protected, nor are they living up to the minimum
standards provided for under Chapter 17 of NAFTA. This leaves
individuals, firms, or corporations to utilize the investor-state dispute
resolution provisions under Chapter 11-a process that still has not
128. See William R. Long, Latin Markets Dive in "Tequila Effect" Reaction to
Mexico, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 11, 1995), http://articles.latimes.com/1995-01-
11/business/fi-18831_1_tequila-effect.
129. Mary Anastasia O'Grady, The Rise of Mexico's Middle Class, WALL ST.
J. (Mar. 2, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 1000142405297
0203986604577257341514055760.html. See generally LUIS DE LA CALLE & Luis
RUBIO, MEXICO: A MIDDLE CLASS SOCIETY-POOR No MORE, DEVELOPED NOT
Yet (Mexico Inst. 2012), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/
default/files/Mexico%20A%2OMiddle%20Class%20Society.pdf.
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been utilized due to the costs and time involved. Alternatively,
victims of IPR violations must find some other way to negotiate at a
non-state to non-state level (like traditional nationally-based
litigation).
As the twentieth anniversary of NAFTA approaches, we can
examine the last two decades and determine how far we have come in
terms of the settlement of IP disputes in international trade
agreements. While NAFTA was an important milestone in providing
for dispute resolution for IPR violations, the mechanisms that this
agreement provides have not been utilized.

